# From verification to causality-based explications

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Joint work with:

Clemens Dubslaff Florian Funke Stefan Kiefer Simon Jantsch Rupak Majumdar Corto Mascle Jakob Piribauer Robin Ziemek

Classical verification task:

given: a system model  $\mathcal{M}$  and a specification  $\phi$ question: does  $\mathcal{M}$  satisfy  $\phi$ ?

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Explication task (in the verification context):

... should provide deeper insights why the specification holds or not



Explication task (in the verification context):

- what causes the specification to hold for the full model ?
- who is responsible for a requirement violation ? and to which degree?
- if a bad behavior occurs, what has caused the violation of the specification ?



Explication task (in the verification context):

- who is responsible for a requirem "causality meets verification"
  if a bad behavior
- if a bad behavior occurs, what has surged the violation of the specification ?

# Causality

long-standing discussion in philosophy

David Hume (philosopher, 1711-1776)



painting from Allan Ramsay David K. Lewis (philosopher, 1941-2001)



and many more ...

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# Causality

#### long-standing discussion in philosophy, but also AI

Joseph Halpern Gödel Prize 1997 Dijkstra Prize 2009



©CC BY-SA 2.0 fr Joe Halpern at EPFL in June 2008

#### Judea Pearl

Turing Award Winner 2011



taken from Judea Pearl's homepage UCLA Cognitive Systems Laboratory





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- $_{\star}\,$  deterministic vs probabilistic causes, and many more  $\ldots$

program slicing

[Weiser'79]

which program statements affect the values of variables at a certain program location?

program slicing

[Weiser'79]

- causality-based explanations of counterexamples
  - \* counterfactual reasoning with distance metrics
  - \* identification of "critical state-variable pairs" in cex
  - \* event order logic for causal dependencies in cex

[Groce et al'06] [Beer et al'09] [Leitner-Fischer/Leue'13]

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 causality-based verification proof rules for stepwise cause-effect reasoning

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# Outline

- Introduction
- Necessary and sufficient causes
- Counterfactuality and responsibility in verification
- Probabilistic causality in Markovian models
- Conclusions

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... many possible formalizations ...

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Here: characterization of necessary/sufficient causes using CTL\*

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Monotonicity:

C is necessary and  $C \subseteq D \implies D$  is necessary C is sufficient and  $C \supseteq D \implies D$  is sufficient

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Transitivity (up to disjointness):

C necessary for D & D necessary for  $E \implies C$  necessary for EC sufficient for D & D sufficient for  $E \implies C$  sufficient for E

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If all *E*-states are terminal then:

$$\begin{array}{ll} C \text{ is necessary} & \text{iff} & \mathcal{M} \models \forall (\Diamond E \to \Diamond C) \\ C \text{ is sufficient} & \text{iff} & \mathcal{M} \models \forall (\Diamond C \to \Diamond E) \end{array}$$

#### **Example:** necessary and sufficient causes

Given a TS  $\mathcal{M}$  with state space S and a set  $E \subseteq S$  of effect states (non-initial, terminal). Let  $C \subseteq S$  s.t.  $C \cap E = \emptyset$ . Then:

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If C is a necessary resp. sufficient cause for E then so is its pruning  $\lfloor C \rfloor$ , defined by:

$$\lfloor C \rfloor = \big\{ s \in C : \mathcal{M} \models \exists (\neg C) \, \mathsf{U} \, s \big\}$$

 $\lfloor C \rfloor$  results from *C* by removing all states *s* where each path  $\pi$  from an initial state to *s* traverses another *C*-state. Hence:  $\pi \models \Diamond C$  iff  $\pi \models \Diamond \lfloor C \rfloor$ .

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... towards small and early causes ("root causes") ...

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there is no reachable state ss.t.  $s \models \forall \bigcirc \forall \Diamond E$ 

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... is indeed a good one, with maximal degree of necessity (see later)

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- How to define "good necessary causes"?

Idea: seek for necessary causes that are "maximal sufficient"

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If **C** is a necessary cause then the degree of necessity is 1.

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C and  $\lfloor C \rfloor$  have the same degree of suffiency and necessity.

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$$[C_E]$$
 where  $C_E \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{s \in S : s \models \forall \bigcirc \forall \Diamond E\}$ 

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Necessary causes with maximal degree of sufficiency:

[*Pre*(*E*)]

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Necessary causes with maximal degree of sufficiency:

[Pre(E)] and [C] where  $C = \{s \in S : Pr_s(\Diamond Pre(E)) = 1\}$ 

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State-minimal necessary causes computable in polynomial time using algorithms for weight-minimal s-t-cuts in directed graphs

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  - Halpern-Pearl's approach to counterfactual causality
  - mutation-based forward responsibility
  - · game-based forward and backward responsibility
  - quantitative responsibility via Shapley values
- Probabilistic causality in Markovian models
- Conclusions

#### Halpern-Pearl's approach to causality



## Halpern-Pearl's approach to causality

- \* actual/specific vs general/type causes actual cause is a factual event C that causes the effect E general cause: e.g. "sweets cause obesity"
- \* backward vs forward causality-based reasoning backward: what has caused an observed effect *E* (e.g., observed event sequence)? forward: what can cause an event *E* in a given world model?
- \* counterfactual vs necessary vs sufficient cause-effect relations counterfactual: if C would not have happened, then E would not have occured necessary: if E occurs then C must have happened before sufficient: if C happens then always E will occur somewhen later
- $\star$  deterministic vs probabilistic causes, and many more  $\ldots$

Structural equation model: S = (Exo, Endo, f) where

- **Exo**: set of exogenous variables (specify the context)
- **Endo**: totally ordered set of endogenous variables, say  $x_1, \ldots, x_n$

 $x_1$  only depends on the context  $x_2$  only depends on the context and  $x_1$   $x_3$  only depends on the context and  $x_1$ ,  $x_2$  $\vdots$   $\vdots$   $\vdots$ 

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f yields the values of the endo variables for context  $c \in Val(Exo)$ 

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 $Val(\mathcal{V}) = \mathsf{set} \mathsf{ of valuations for the variables in } \mathcal{V} \subseteq \mathit{Exo} \cup \mathit{Endo}$ 

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**f** yields the values of the endo variables for context  $c \in Val(Exo)$ :

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \alpha_1 & = & \mathcal{S}_1(c) & \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} & f_1(c) & (\text{value for } x_1) \\ \alpha_2 & = & \mathcal{S}_2(c) & \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} & f_2(c, \alpha_1) & (\text{value for } x_2) \\ & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \alpha_n & = & \mathcal{S}_n(c) & \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} & f_n(c, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}) & (\text{value for } x_n) \end{array}$$

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for counterfactual reasoning:

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Interventions: given  $Y \subseteq Endo$  and  $\beta \in Val(Y)$ , let

 $\mathcal{S}[Y \leftarrow \beta] = \begin{cases} \mathcal{S} \text{ when the } Y \text{-variables are treated as} \\ \text{constants given by the values in } \beta \end{cases}$ 

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# **HP** causality

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Let S = (Exo, Endo, f) be a structural equation model and

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- $X \subseteq Endo$  and  $\alpha = S_X(c)$

tuple of values for X in S for context c obtained by the equations  $x_i = f_i(c, x_1, \dots, x_{i-1})$
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- $X \subseteq Endo$  and  $\alpha = S_X(c)$
- Then  $X = \alpha$  is called a cause for  $\varphi$  in context *c* iff
  - [AC1] ... counterfactual condition ...

[AC2] ... minimality condition ....

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Then  $X = \alpha$  is a but-for cause for  $\varphi$  in context **c** iff

[AC1] There is  $\beta \in Val(X)$  such that  $(\mathcal{S}[X \leftarrow \beta], c) \models \neg \varphi$ 

[AC2] ... minimality condition ....

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[AC2] X is minimal w.r.t. condition [AC1]

## HP causality and degree of responsibility

Let S = (Exo, Endo, f) be a structural equation model and

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- $c \in Val(Exo)$  a context s.t.  $(S, c) \models \varphi$
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Then, the degree of responsibility of  $x=\alpha$  for  $\varphi$  is  $\frac{1}{m}$  where

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Formally: m = |X| where X is a smallest set of endogenous variables that contains x and satisfies [AC1], i.e., there exist a valuation  $\beta$  for X and  $Y \subseteq Endo$  s.t.:  $(S[X \leftarrow \beta, Y \leftarrow S_Y(c)], c) \models \neg \varphi$ 

# Outline

- Introduction
- Necessary and sufficient causes
- · Counterfactuality and responsibility in verification
  - Halpern-Pearl's approach to counterfactual causality
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#### HP-based responsibility in TS



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backward counterfactual causality

given an effect secanrio:

"if the cause would not have happened, then the effect would not have occured"

intervention: modify cause items

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#### forward counterfactual causality = forward responsibility

given a world model:

"minimal set of items that need to be modified to avoid the effect"

#### degree of responsibility:

numerical values for individual cause items

Given a transition system  $\mathcal{M}$  with state space S and labeling functions  $(L_s)_{s \in S}$  where  $L_s : AP \to \{0, 1\}$ .

Intuitively:  $L_s(q) = 1$  iff atomic proposition q holds in state s

Given a transition system  $\mathcal{M}$  with state space S and labeling functions  $(L_s)_{s \in S}$  where  $L_s : AP \to \{0, 1\}$ .

Intervention ("mutations of the truth values of atomic propositions"):

• Given  $q \in AP$  and  $T \subseteq S$ , then  $\mathcal{M}_{T,q}$  is  $\mathcal{M}$  with flipped labeling values  $L_t(q)$  for  $t \in T$ .

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$$T = \{t_1, t_2\}$$

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Suppose  $\mathcal{M} \models \phi$  (temporal property over  $2^{AP}$ ) and let  $q \in AP$ .

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• switching pair: (T, s) where  $T \subseteq S$ ,  $s \in S$  s.t.

 $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{T},q} \models \phi$  and  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{T} \cup \{s\},q} \not\models \phi$ 

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state s is a q-cause state for M ⊨ φ if there exists a switching pair (T, s)

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degree of *q*-responsibility of cause state *s* is 1/(|*T*|+1) where (*T*, *s*) is a switching pair of minimal size



 $AP = \{q\}$  $s_1, s_2, s_3 \not\models q$ 









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Intervention:

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So far: notions of q-cause and degree of q-responsibility for fixed atomic proposition q

Analogous definition independent of specific atomic proposition

Intervention:

• given  $T \subseteq S \times AP$ , then  $\mathcal{M}_T$  equals  $\mathcal{M}$  with flipped values for the pairs  $(s, q) \in T$ 

Suppose  $\mathcal{M} \models \phi$ 

*cause:* set T s.t.  $\mathcal{M}_T \not\models \phi$  and  $\mathcal{M}_U \models \phi$  for any subset U of T

degree of responsibility of pair (s, q) is 1/(|T|+1) where  $T \cup \{(s, q)\}$  is a cause of minimal size (under all causes containing (s, q))

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[Baier/Funke/Majumdar, IJCAI'21]

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- forward: in which states do we need to control the nondeterminism to ensure that \$\phi\$ does not hold in \$\mathcal{M}\$?
- *backward:* for a given execution where  $\phi$  holds, which states were responsible for the satisfaction of  $\phi$ ?

which states would have had the option to avoid the bad event by resolving the nondeterministic choices in a different way?

[Baier/Funke/Majumdar, IJCAI'21]

Starting point: transition system  $\mathcal{M}$  with state space S and a path property  $\phi$  (bad event).

Game-based notions of responsibility for sets  $C \subseteq S$ 

w.r.t. to their power of avoiding the bad event in terms of their nondeterministic choices
## Responsibility w.r.t. nondeterministic choices

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Game-based notions of responsibility for sets  $C \subseteq S$ w.r.t. to their power of avoiding the bad event in terms of their nondeterministic choices

using the two-player game structure  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{C}}$ :

- arena: state space, initial state and transitions of  ${oldsymbol{\mathcal{M}}}$
- player 1 controls all states in C (objective  $\neg \phi$ )
- player 2 controls all states in  $\overline{C} = S \setminus C$  (objective  $\phi$ )

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Observations:

- If  $\mathcal{M} \models \forall \phi$  then noone is forward responsible, and vice versa.
- If  $\mathcal{M} \models \forall \neg \phi$  then exactly  $\mathcal{C} = \emptyset$  is forward responsible.



$$\phi = \Diamond fail$$
 ("bad event")

**C** is forward responsible for  $\phi$  if [F1] **C** has a winning strategy in  $\mathcal{M}_C$  for objective  $\neg \phi$ [F2] **C** is minimal w.r.t. [F1]



 $\phi = \Diamond fail$  ("bad event") forward responsible sets:  $\{t, u\}$ 

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# **Responsibility in TS**

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"which states are responsible for the satisfaction of a property of the entire model?"

now: backward responsibility

"which states are responsible for the satisfaction of an undesired property along a given error scenario?"

# **Responsibility in TS**

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"which states are responsible for the satisfaction of an undesired property along a given error scenario?"

- \* strategic view: error scenario is a path
- $\star$  causality-based view: error scenario is a path + strategy for opponents

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- [SB1] there exists  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  such that C has a winning strategy in  $\mathcal{M}_C$  for objective  $\neg \phi$  from state  $s_n$ 
  - i.e., C could have played differently from  $s_n$  to enforce the violation of  $\phi$

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objective from state  $s_n$ :  $\neg \phi$  if  $\phi$  is prefix independent, but residual property " $\neg \phi$  after  $s_0 \dots s_{n-1}$ " in the general case

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Strategy profile  $\sigma$  specifies

- a path (the unique  $\sigma$ -play  $\pi_{\sigma}$ )
- **C**'s decision along other paths (for counterfactual reasoning)
- C's decision along other paths (irrelevant)

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i.e., **C** could have played differently to enforce the violation of  $\phi$ , when the strategy for the other states is fixed

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**C** is causally backward responsible for " $\mathcal{M}, \sigma \models \phi$ " if

[CB1] there exists a strategy  $\tau_{C}$  for C in  $\mathcal{M}_{C}$  s.t. the unique  $(\tau_{C}, \sigma_{\overline{C}})$ -play satisfies  $\neg \phi$ 

i.e., **C** could have played differently to enforce the violation of  $\phi$ , when the strategy for the other states is fixed

[CB2] C is minimal w.r.t. [CB1]

i.e., no proper subset of **C** can enforce the violation of  $\phi$ , when the other states stick to their strategy



 $\phi = \Diamond fail$  ("bad event")



 $\phi = \diamondsuit fail ("bad event")$ path *s t fail*  $\models \phi$ 



 $\phi = \Diamond fail ("bad event")$ path *s t fail*  $\models \phi$ strat-backward responsible:  $\{s, u\}$ 



 $\phi = \oint fail ("bad event")$ path *s t fail*  $\models \phi$ strat-backward responsible:  $\{s, u\}$   $\{t\}$ 



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strategy profile:  $s \rightarrow t, t \rightarrow f, u \rightarrow g_2$ 



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causally backward responsible:  $\{t\}$ ; change  $t \rightarrow g_1$ 



 $\phi = \Diamond fail$  ("bad event")

strategy profile:  $s \rightarrow t, t \rightarrow f, u \rightarrow g_2$ 

causally backward responsible:  $\{t\}$ ; change  $t \rightarrow g_1$  $\{s\}$ ; change  $s \rightarrow u$ 

f-responsible = forward responsible sb-responsible = strategically backward responsible cb-responsible = causally backward responsible



f-responsible = forward responsible sb-responsible = strategically backward responsible cb-responsible = causally backward responsible

f-responsibility  $\implies$  sb-responsibility  $\implies$  cb-responsibility

Let **C** be a set of states.

• **C** is f-responsible for  $\phi$  iff **C** contains a coalition that is sb-responsible for all  $\pi \models \phi$ , and is minimal w.r.t. this property.

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- If **C** is sb-responsible for  $\pi \models \phi$  and  $\sigma$  a strategy profile s.t.  $\pi$  is the  $\sigma$ -play then **C** contains a coalition that is cb-responsible for  $\mathcal{M}, \sigma \models \phi$ .



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### HP-causality and cb-responsibility



### HP-causality and cb-responsibility

structural equation model 
$$S = (Exo, Endo, f)$$
  
context  $c \in Val(Exo)$   
 $\downarrow$   
tree-like transition system  $M_{Sc}$ 

total order for endo variables:  $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ 

- root (level 0): given context c
- states at level  $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ : valuations for  $x_1, \ldots, x_{i-1}, x_i$
- transitions of state  $\mathbf{s} = [\mathbf{x}_1 = \alpha_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{i-1} = \alpha_{i-1}]$  at level i-1:

default transition:  $s \rightarrow [s, x_i = f_i(c, s)]$  $s \rightarrow [s, x_i = \beta]$  for any other value  $\beta$ intervention:

### HP-causality and cb-responsibility

structural equation model S = (Exo, Endo, f)context  $c \in Val(Exo)$  $\downarrow\downarrow$  total order for endo variables: **x**<sub>1</sub>,...,**x**<sub>n</sub>

tree-like transition system  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{S},c}$ 

Given a Boolean condition  $\varphi$  for the endogenous variables:

 $X = \alpha$  is a but-for cause for  $\varphi$ 

iff the X-states constitute a cb-responsible coalition for  $\phi$  under the default strategy profile

where  $\phi = \Diamond \ \ \phi \text{ holds at some leave''}$  and  $\alpha = S_X(c)$ 

# Outline

- Introduction
- Necessary and sufficient causes
- · Counterfactuality and responsibility in verification
  - Halpern-Pearl's approach to counterfactual causality
  - mutation-based forward responsibility
  - game-based forward and backward responsibility
  - quantitative responsibility via Shapley values
- Probabilistic causality in Markovian models
- Conclusions

# **Shapley values**



#### Lloyd S. Shapley (Nobel prize 2012 for Economics)



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Cooperative game: one-shot game consisting of

- a finite set of agents, say  $Ag = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ ,
- a payoff function  $val: 2^{Ag} \to \mathbb{R}$  s.t.  $val(\emptyset) = 0$

$$val(C) = value of coalition C \subseteq Ag$$

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Given a total order  $\pi$  of Ag and an agent  $a \in Ag$ :  $\pi_{\geq a} = \{i \in Ag \mid \pi(i) \geq \pi(a)\}$ 

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$$val(\pi_{\geq a}) - val(\pi_{>a})$$

contribution of agent **a** to the value of coalition  $\pi_{\geqslant a}$ 

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Given a total order  $\pi$  of Ag and an agent  $a \in Ag$ :  $\pi_{\geq a} = \{i \in Ag \mid \pi(i) \geq \pi(a)\}$ 

Shapley value:  $Sh(a) = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{\pi \in \Pi_n} (val(\pi_{\geq a}) - val(\pi_{>a}))$ contribution of agent *a* to the value of coalition  $\pi_{\geq a}$ "average contribution of agent *a*"

Cooperative game: one-shot game consisting of

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Given a total order  $\pi$  of Ag and an agent  $a \in Ag$ :  $\pi_{\geq a} = \{i \in Ag \mid \pi(i) \geq \pi(a)\}$ 

Shapley value:  $Sh(a) = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{\pi \in \Pi_n} \left( val(\pi_{\geq a}) - val(\pi_{>a}) \right)$ 

$$=\sum_{\substack{C \subseteq A_{g} \\ a \notin C}} \frac{|C|!(n-|C|-1)!}{n!} (val(C \cup \{a\}) - val(C))$$

Given: a transition system  $\mathcal{M}$  with state space S and initial state  $s_0$  and a path property  $\phi$  (e.g. LTL formula).

[Mascle/Baier/Funke/Jantsch/Kiefer, LICS'21]

Given: a transition system  $\mathcal{M}$  with state space S and initial state  $s_0$  and a path property  $\phi$  (e.g. LTL formula).

Goal: define a measure for the *impact of the states*  $s \in S$  on the truth value of  $\phi$  in terms of their nondeterministic choices.

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Game-based view:

- states may build coalitions that attempt to enforce  $\phi$  no matter how the other states resolve their nondeterministic choices
- importance value of a state = Shapley value when the payoff is 1 for any coalition that can enforce \$\phi\$ and 0 otherwise

Given: a transition system  $\mathcal{M}$  with state space S and initial state  $s_0$  and a path property  $\phi$  (e.g. LTL formula).

Let  $C \subseteq S$  ... a coalition of states

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Let  $C \subseteq S$  and  $\mathcal{M}_C$  as before with objective  $\phi$  for C

two-player turn-based game  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{C}}$ :

- arena: state space, initial state and transitions of *M*
- player 1 controls all states in C (objective  $\phi$ )
- player 2 controls all states in  $\overline{C} = S \setminus C$  (objective  $\neg \phi$ )

Given: a transition system  $\mathcal{M}$  with state space S and initial state  $s_0$  and a path property  $\phi$  (e.g. LTL formula).

Let  $C \subseteq S$  and  $\mathcal{M}_C$  as before with objective  $\phi$  for CPayoff value of coalition C:

$$val_{\phi}(C) = \begin{cases} 1 : \text{ if } C \text{ has a winning strategy in } \mathcal{M}_{C} \text{ for } \phi \\ 0 : \text{ otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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in the simple cooperative game with agent set Ag = S and payoff function  $val_{\phi}$ 

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in the simple cooperative game with agent set Ag = S and payoff function  $val_{\phi}$ 0/1-values and monotonicity, i.e., if  $C \subseteq D$  then  $val_{\phi}(C) \leq val_{\phi}(D)$ 

Importance value of state s = Shapley value of s

$$\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s) = \sum_{\substack{C \subseteq S \\ s \notin C}} \frac{|C|!(n-|C|-1)!}{n!} \left( \underbrace{val_{\phi}(C \cup \{s\}) - val_{\phi}(C)}_{0 \text{ or } 1} \right)$$

n = |S|

Importance value of state s = Shapley value of s = |S|

$$\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s) = \sum_{\substack{C \subseteq S \\ s \notin C}} \frac{|C|!(n-|C|-1)!}{n!} \left( \operatorname{val}_{\phi}(C \cup \{s\}) - \operatorname{val}_{\phi}(C) \right)$$
$$= \sum_{\substack{(C,s) \\ \text{switching}}} \frac{|C|!(n-|C|-1)!}{n!} \xrightarrow{0 \text{ or } 1}$$

where (C, s) is switching iff  $val_{\phi}(C \cup \{s\}) = 1$  and  $val_{\phi}(C) = 0$ 

Importance value of state s = Shapley value of s = |S|

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where (C, s) is switching iff  $val_{\phi}(C \cup \{s\}) = 1$  and  $val_{\phi}(C) = 0$  $\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s) > 0$  iff s is relevant, i.e., there is a switching pair (C, s)

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$$\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s) = \sum_{\substack{C \subseteq S \\ s \notin C}} \frac{|C|!(n-|C|-1)!}{n!} \left( val_{\phi}(C \cup \{s\}) - val_{\phi}(C) \right)$$
$$= \sum_{\substack{(C,s) \\ \text{switching}}} \frac{|C|!(n-|C|-1)!}{n!} = \sum_{\substack{(C,s) \\ r \in \text{evant}}} \frac{|C|!(r-|C|-1)!}{r!} \text{ where } r = |R|$$

where (C, s) is switching iff  $val_{\phi}(C \cup \{s\}) = 1$  and  $val_{\phi}(C) = 0$ 

 $\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s) > 0$  iff s is relevant, i.e., there is a switching pair (C, s)

A switching pair (C, s) is relevant iff  $C \subseteq R$  = set of relevant states

Importance value of state s = Shapley value of s

$$\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s) = \sum_{\substack{(C,s)\\ r \in evant}} \frac{|C|!(r-|C|-1)!}{r!} \quad \text{where } r = \# \text{ relevant states}$$

Zero-sum property of the game structure  $\mathcal{M}_{C}$  yields:

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 $D$   
 $|D| = r - |C| - 1$  and  $\frac{|C|!(r - |C| - 1)!}{r!} = \frac{|D|!(r - |D| - 1)!}{r!}$ 

Н

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ence:  $\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s) = \mathcal{I}_{\neg\phi}(s)$ 

"importance of states on the truth value (satisfaction or violation) of  $\phi$ "



$$\phi = \Box \Diamond s \land \Diamond \Box \neg f$$

$$\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s) = \sum_{\substack{(C,s)\\ r \in vant}} \frac{|C|!(r-|C|-1)!}{r!}$$
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deterministic states are irrelevant (importance value 0)

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two relevant pairs:  $(\{w\}, g), (\{g\}, w)$ 

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deterministic states are irrelevant (importance value 0)

two relevant pairs:  $(\{w\}, g)$ ,  $(\{g\}, w)$  $\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(w) = \mathcal{I}_{\phi}(g) = \frac{1!(2-1-1)!}{2!} = \frac{1!0!}{2!} = \frac{1}{2}$ 

$$\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s) = \sum_{\substack{(C,s)\\ relevant}} rac{|C|!(r-|C|-1)!}{r!}$$
 where  $r=\#$  relevant states



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state **f** is irrelevant

*C* has a winning strategy iff  $g \in C$  and  $|C \cap \{w_1, w_2, s\}| \ge 2$ In particular: r = 4

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4 relevant pairs for g and  $\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(g) = 3 \cdot \frac{2!(4-2-1)!}{4!} + \frac{3!(4-3-1)!}{4!} = \frac{1}{2}$
#### Importance values: example



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#### Importance values: example



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#### Importance values: algorithmic problems

For transition system  $\mathcal{M}$  with state space S and path property  $\phi$ .

Value problem: given  $C \subseteq S$ , check whether  $val_{\phi}(C) = 1$ 

Usefulness problem: given state s, decide whether  $\mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s) > 0$ 

Importance problem:

given state s, compute  $n! \mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s)$ 

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Importance problem:

given state s, compute  $n! \mathcal{I}_{\phi}(s)$ 

Solving the usefulness and importance problems, via standard game solving algorithms + guessing relevant pairs.

	Büchi	Rabin	Streett	Parity	LTL
Value problem	Р	NP	coNP	$\in \mathrm{NP}\cap\mathrm{coNP}$	2EXP
Usefulness problem	NP	$\Sigma_2^P$	$\Sigma_2^P$	NP	2EXP
Importance problem	#P	$\# P^{NP}$	$\#P^{NP}$	#P	2EXP

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Value problem: classical results for games

	Büchi	Rabin	Streett	Parity	LTL
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Usefulness problem	NP	$\Sigma_2^P$	$\Sigma_2^P$	NP	2EXP
Importance problem	#P	$\# P^{NP}$	$\#P^{NP}$	#P	2EXP

NP-completeness of the usefulness problem for Büchi conditions

- upper bound via guess-&-check method nondeterministically guess a set C and check whether (C, s) is relevant (with poly-time algorithm for Büchi games)
- $\operatorname{NP}\textsc{-hardness}$  via reduction from 3SAT

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Value problem	Р	NP	coNP	$\in \mathrm{NP}\cap\mathrm{coNP}$	2EXP
Usefulness problem	NP	$\Sigma_2^P$	$\Sigma_2^P$	NP	2EXP
Importance problem	#P	$\# P^{NP}$	$\#P^{NP}$	#P	2EXP

 $\Sigma_2^p$ -completeness of the usefulness problem for Rabin conditions

- upper bound via guess-&-check method nondeterministically guess a set C and check whether (C, s) is relevant (with NP-oracle for Rabin games)
- $\Sigma_2^p$ -hardness via reduction from dual of  $\forall \exists 3SAT$

# Break

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- Conclusions

#### ... extensively studied in philosophy

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Reichenbach (1956) Suppes (1970) and many more

rmon from the name neconstance control of the University of Pittsburgh, All rights to

Hans Reichenbach

#### ... extensively studied in philosophy, but also in AI

Reichenbach (1956) Suppes (1970) and many more

Judea Pearl

Turing Award Winner 2011



taken from Judea Pearl's homepage UCLA Cognitive Systems Laboratory



... extensively studied in philosophy, but also in AI

Two main principles:

Temporal condition:

Probability-raising condition:

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Temporal condition: Causes occur before their effects. Probability-raising condition: Pr( effect | cause ) > Pr( effect | ¬ cause )

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Two main principles:

Temporal condition: Causes occur before their effects. Probability-raising condition:  $\Pr(\text{effect} \mid \text{cause}) > \Pr(\text{effect} \mid \neg \text{cause})$ equivalently:  $\Pr(\text{ effect} \mid \text{cause}) > \Pr(\text{ effect})$ 

... extensively studied in philosophy, but also in AI

Two main principles:

Temporal condition: Causes occur before their effects. Probability-raising condition:  $\Pr(\text{effect} \mid \text{cause}) > \Pr(\text{effect} \mid \neg \text{cause})$ probabilistic form of counterfactuality: "effects are less likely if their causes do not occur"

Only very few research so far:

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- formalization for sets of states by PCTL-constraints in Markov chains [Kleinberg, PhD thesis 2010]
- formalization as probabilistic hyperproperties
  - in Markov chains [Ábrahám/Bonakdarpour, QEST'18] in Markov decision processes [Dimitrova/Finkbeiner/Torfah, ATVA'20]
- cause-effect relations for regular causes and ω-regular effects in Markov chains
  [B./Funke/Jantsch/Piribauer/Ziemek, ATVA'21]
- cause-effect relations for sets of states in Markov decision processes
  [B./Funke/Piribauer/Ziemek, FoSSaCS'22]

In what follows:  $\mathcal{M}$  is a (discrete-time) Markov chain with

- finite state space S
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 effect probability in  $\mathcal{M}$   
 $\Pr_{s}(\Diamond E)$  effect probability from state  $s$ 

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$$\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E) \quad \text{effect probability in } \mathcal{M} = \sum_{s \in S} \iota(s) \cdot \Pr_{s}(\Diamond E)$$
$$\Pr_{s}(\Diamond E) \quad \text{effect probability from state } s$$

[Kleinberg, PhD thesis 2010]

Let **C** a set of states with  $C \cap E = \emptyset$ .

C is called a (prima facie) cause for E if there exists  $p \in [0, 1]$  s.t.

 $\mathcal{M} \models \mathbb{P}_{< p}(\Diamond E)$  and  $\mathcal{M} \models \forall \Box (C \rightarrow \mathbb{P}_{\geq p}(\Diamond E))$ 

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Kleinberg, PhD thesis 2010]

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# **PCTL-characterization of causality in MC**

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strict probability-raising condition (elementwise for all *C*-states)

Let **C** a set of states with  $C \cap E = \emptyset$ .

• C is a strict probability-raising (SPR) cause for E iff

 $\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E) < \Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E | \Diamond s) \text{ for all } s \in C$  $\underbrace{\Pr_{\mathcal{N}}(\Diamond E)}_{\Pr_{s}(\Diamond E)}$ 

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  - C is a strict probability-raising (SPR) cause for E iff

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• C is a global probability-raising (GPR) cause for E iff

 $\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E) < \Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E | \Diamond C)$ 

conditional probability  

$$\sum_{s \in C} \Pr_{\mathcal{M}}((\neg C) \cup s) \cdot \Pr_{s}(\Diamond E)$$

$$\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond C)$$

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plus some minimality constraint (omitted here)

"no *C*-state is fully covered by other *C*-states" i.e., for each state  $s \in C$  there is a path  $\pi$  in  $\mathcal{M}$  with  $\pi \models (\neg C) \cup s$ .

Let **C** a set of states with  $C \cap E = \emptyset$ .

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• Each SPR cause is a GPR cause.

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plus some minimality constraint (omitted here)

- Each SPR cause is a GPR cause.
- If **C** is a singleton then:

**C** is a SPR cause iff **C** is a GPR cause



MC  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state seffect set  $E = \{e_1, e_2\}$ 



MC  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state **s** effect set  $E = \{e_1, e_2\}$  $\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E) = \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{12} = \frac{1}{2}$ 



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• C is not an SPR cause as  $\operatorname{Pr}_{c_1}(\Diamond E) = \frac{1}{4} < \frac{1}{2} = \operatorname{Pr}_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E)$ • C is a GPR cause as  $\operatorname{Pr}_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E | \Diamond C) = \frac{\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{4}}{\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3}} = \frac{\frac{5}{12}}{\frac{2}{3}} = \frac{5}{8} > \frac{1}{2} = \operatorname{Pr}_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E)$ 



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There is no GPR cause as for any  $C \subseteq \{s_1, s_2, s_3\}$ :  $\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E | \Diamond C) = \frac{1}{2} = \Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E)$ 



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Well justified, as the events & E and & C are stochastically independent for any C.

# Markov decision processes (MDP)

... extension of Markov chains by nondeterministic choices ...

# Markov decision processes (MDP)

- finite state space S with initial distribution  $\iota: S \rightarrow [0,1]$
- finite set of action Act
- for each state  $s \in S$ :
  - \* *Act(s)*: set of enabled actions in state *s*
  - \* for each action  $\alpha \in Act(s)$ : distribution  $P_{s,\alpha} : S \rightarrow [0,1]$ for the  $\alpha$ -successors of s



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Scheduler (a.k.a. policy, adversary, strategy): resolves the nondeterminism

- \* selects distributions over enabled actions (might be history-dependent)
- \* induced stochastic process is a Markov chain (tree-like, possibly infinite)

... generalize the definition of SPR and GPR causes for MDPs ...

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Assumptions: given an MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with state space S and:

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... generalize the definition of SPR and GPR causes for MDPs ...

Assumptions: given an MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with state space S and:

- fixed effect set *E* consisting of terminal states (i.e., have no enabled action)
- all states in **S** are reachable from at least one initial state
- all states in **S** from which **E** is not reachable are terminal

# PR causes in MCs (repetition)

Let C a set of states with  $C \cap E = \emptyset$ . C is a

• SPR cause for E iff for all  $s \in C$ 

 $\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E) < \Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E | \diamond s)$ 

• GPR cause for *E* iff

 $\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E) < \Pr_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E \,|\, \Diamond C\,)$ 

SPR: strict probability-raising GPR: global probability-raising

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• GPR cause for **E** iff for all schedulers  $\sigma$ :

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 $\mathbf{Pr}^{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_{\boldsymbol{\mathcal{M}}}(...) = \begin{cases} \text{ probability measure of the Markov chain} \\ \text{ induced by scheduler } \boldsymbol{\sigma} \end{cases}$ 

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• GPR cause for E iff for all schedulers  $\sigma$ :

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MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state *i* effect set  $\boldsymbol{E} = \{\boldsymbol{e}\}$ 



MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state *i* effect set  $E = \{e\}$ Is  $C = \{c\}$  a PR cause?



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Consider the scheduler  $\sigma$  that schedules  $\beta$  for the first visit of s and  $\alpha$  for the second visit of s.





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 $\Pr^{\sigma}_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 \cdot \frac{1}{4} = \frac{5}{16}$ 



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MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state *i* effect set  $\mathbf{E} = \{\mathbf{e}\}$ Is  $\mathbf{C} = \{\mathbf{c}\}$  a PR cause? No, although PR condition holds for all memoryless schedulers

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Consider MR-scheduler  $\sigma = \sigma_{\lambda}$  with  $\sigma(s)(\alpha) = \lambda$  and  $\sigma(s)(\beta) = 1 - \lambda$ .

MR = memoryless randomized



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some positive value


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Consequence: Memory can be needed for refuting the PR condition!



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MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state *i* 

effect set 
$$E = \{e_1, e_2\}$$

Is 
$$C = \{c\}$$
 a PR cause?

No

Consider the scheduler  $\sigma$  that schedules  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  with probability 1/2 in state *i*.





MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state *i* 

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Consider the scheduler  $\sigma$  that schedules  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  with probability 1/2 in state *i*.

 $\Pr^{\sigma}_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} = \frac{5}{8}$ 



MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state *i* 

effect set 
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Is 
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 a PR cause?

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Consider the scheduler  $\sigma$  that schedules  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  with probability 1/2 in state *i*.

 $\Pr^{\sigma}_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} = \frac{5}{8} > \frac{1}{2} = \Pr^{\sigma}_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E | \Diamond c)$ 



MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state *i* 

effect set 
$$E = \{e_1, e_2\}$$

Is  $C = \{c\}$  a PR cause?

No, although PR condition holds for all deterministic schedulers

Consider the scheduler  $\sigma$  that schedules  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  with probability 1/2 in state *i*.  $\mathbf{Pr}^{\sigma}_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} = \frac{5}{8} > \frac{1}{2} = \mathbf{Pr}^{\sigma}_{\mathcal{M}}(\Diamond E | \Diamond c)$ 



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Consider the deterministic schedulers  $\sigma_{\alpha}$  and  $\sigma_{\beta}$  that schedule  $\alpha$  resp.  $\beta$  in state *i*.





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 $\sigma_{\alpha}$  irrelevant for PR condition as state *c* is not reachable



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Consider the deterministic schedulers  $\sigma_{\alpha}$  and  $\sigma_{\beta}$  that schedule  $\alpha$  resp.  $\beta$  in state *i*.

 $\sigma_{\alpha}$  irrelevant for PR condition as state c is not reachable  $\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{\sigma_{\beta}}(\Diamond E) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4} < \frac{1}{2} = \Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{\sigma_{\beta}}(\Diamond E | \Diamond c)$ 



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Consider the deterministic schedulers  $\sigma_{\alpha}$  and  $\sigma_{\beta}$  that schedule  $\alpha$  resp.  $\beta$  in state *i*.

Consequence: Randomization needed for refuting the PR condition!



MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state *i* effect set  $E = \{e_1, e_2\}$ Is  $C = \{c\}$  a PR cause? Yes !!



MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state *i* 

effect set 
$$E = \{e_1, e_2\}$$

Is 
$$C = \{c\}$$
 a PR cause?

Yes !!

Let  $\sigma$  be a scheduler with  $\sigma(i)(\alpha) = \lambda$  and  $\sigma(i)(\beta) = 1 - \lambda$ .





MDP  $\mathcal{M}$  with unique initial state *i* 

effect set 
$$E = \{e_1, e_2\}$$

Is 
$$C = \{c\}$$
 a PR cause?

Yes !!

Let  $\sigma$  be a scheduler with  $\sigma(i)(\alpha) = \lambda$  and  $\sigma(i)(\beta) = 1 - \lambda$ . If  $\lambda = 1$  then  $\sigma$  is irrelevant (as c is not reachable along  $\sigma$ -paths).



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and each  $c \in C$  has a single action with terminal successors (a covered effect state with prob.  $p_c = \Pr_c^{\min}(\Diamond E)$  and a noneffect state with prob.  $1-p_c$ )

(TP)

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Structure of the transformed MDP for fixed effect set E and cause candidate C:



## Checking the SPR condition

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*C* violates the GPR condition iff { there is an MR-scheduler refuting the GPR condition

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Main idea.

use a constraint system with variables

 $\mathbf{x}_{s}$  for the expected frequencies of states  $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbf{S}$ , and

 $x_{s,\alpha}$  for the expected frequencies of state-action pairs  $(s,\alpha)$ under such an MR-scheduler violating the GPR condition

• linear balance equations for the expected frequencies:

$$\begin{array}{ll} x_t &=& \sum_{\alpha} x_{t,\alpha} &=& \sum_{s,\alpha} x_{s,\alpha} \cdot P(s,\alpha,t) & \text{for each non-initial state } t \\ x_{s_0} &=& \sum_{\alpha} x_{s_0,\alpha} &=& \sum_{s,\alpha} x_{s,\alpha} \cdot P(s,\alpha,s_0) + 1 & \text{for the initial state } s_0 \end{array}$$

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• quadratic constraint for the violation of the GPR-condition:

$$x_C \cdot x_{FN} \ge (1-x_C) \cdot \sum_{s \in C} x_s \cdot p_s$$

where  $x_C = \sum_{s \in C} x_s$  (probability for reaching C),  $p_s = \Pr_s^{\min}(\Diamond E)$  and  $x_{FN} = \sum_{s \in FN} x_s$  (prob. for false negatives, i.e., effect without cause)

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linear non-negativity and positivity constraints:

 $x_C > 0$  and  $x_{s,\alpha} \ge 0$  for all state-action pairs

## **Algorithmic problems**

Checking cause-effect relationships: Given  $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{C}$ , check whether

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- algorithmic problems:
  - $\star$  compute quality measure for fixed effect and GPR cause
  - $\star\,$  find optimal GPR cause for fixed effect set

```
precision (accuracy for "(true or false) positives")

prec(C) = \inf_{\sigma} \Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{\sigma}(\Diamond E | \Diamond C)
\stackrel{TP}{TP + FP}
\uparrow
ranges over all schedulers
with \Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{\sigma}(\Diamond C) > 0
```

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TP FN

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already taken into account in the GPR condition; precision says nothing about coverage



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*computing covrat & f-score:* via reduction to SSPP (stoch. shortest path problem)

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f-score (harmonic mean of precision and recall)

fscore(C) = 
$$\frac{2}{X+2}$$
 where  $X = \sup_{\sigma} \frac{FP^{\sigma} + FN^{\sigma}}{TP^{\sigma}}$ 

TP true positive (covered effects) FN false negative (uncovered effects)

TN true negative (noeffect without *C*) FP false positive (noffect after *C*)

coverage ratio (fraction of covered and uncovered effects)

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After model transformation for fixed effect and GPR cause:

• TP, FP, FN, TN are terminal states

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After model transformation for fixed effect and GPR cause:

- TP, FP, FN, TN are terminal states
- recall and f-score can be derived from inf resp. sup of  $\frac{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{c}(\Diamond U)}{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{c}(\Diamond V)}$  quotient of probabilities for reaching disjoint sets of terminal states

### After model transformation ...


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coverage ratio fraction of covered and uncovered effects

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#### f-score

harmonic mean of precision & recall

$$fscore(C) = \frac{2}{X+2}$$
  
where  $X = \sup_{\sigma} \frac{FP^{\sigma} + FN^{\sigma}}{TP^{\sigma}}$ 



#### Given MDP $\mathcal{M}$

- without end components
- U, V disjoint sets of terminal states

Goal: compute  $\inf_{\sigma} \frac{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{\sigma}(\Diamond U)}{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{\sigma}(\Diamond V)}$ (for sup analogous)



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Let  $\mathcal{N}$  be the transformed weighted MDP weight 1 for U, weight 0 for all other states



stochastic process initially: w = 0

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Let  $\mathcal{N}$  be the transformed weighted MDP weight 1 for U, weight 0 for all other states

 generate sample run until reaching a terminal state s
 If s ∈ V then return w and halt. If s ∈ U then w := w+1 and go to 1. If s ∈ T (other terminal state) then go to 1.



stochastic process initially: w = 0expected outcome:  $Pr(\diamond U)$  Given MDP  $\boldsymbol{\mathcal{M}}$ 

- without end components
- U, V disjoint sets of terminal states

Goal: compute  $\inf_{\sigma} \frac{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{r}(\Diamond U)}{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{r}(\Diamond V)}$ 

Let  $\mathcal{N}$  be the transformed weighted MDP weight 1 for U, weight 0 for all other states

 generate sample run until reaching a terminal state s
 If s ∈ V then return w and halt. If s ∈ U then w := w+1 and go to 1. If s ∈ T (other terminal state) then go to 1.



Given MDP  $\mathcal{M}$ 

- without end components
- U, V disjoint sets of terminal states

Goal: compute  $\inf_{\sigma} \frac{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{\sigma}(\Diamond U)}{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{\sigma}(\Diamond V)}$ 

Let  $\mathcal{N}$  be the transformed weighted MDP weight 1 for  $\boldsymbol{U}$ , weight 0 for all other states

 $\inf_{\sigma} \frac{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{\sigma}(\Diamond U)}{\Pr_{\mathcal{M}}^{\sigma}(\Diamond V)} = \inf_{\sigma} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\sigma} (\text{``accumulated weight until reaching } V'')$ stochastic shortest path in  $\mathcal{N}$ 

### Quality measures for causes

- Three measures for the *"degree of coverage"*: recall, coverage ratio, and f-score
- computable in poly-time for fixed effect *E* and GPR cause *C*:
  - \* recall: via standard techniques for conditional probabilities in MDPs
  - $\star\,$  coverage ratio and f-score: via polynomial reduction to SSPP

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  - $\star$  recall: via standard techniques for conditional probabilities in MDPs
  - $\star$  coverage ratio and f-score: via polynomial reduction to SSPP
- optimalization problem:
  - given effect set  $\boldsymbol{E}$ , find an SPR or a GPR cause  $\boldsymbol{C}$  with
    - $\star$  maximal recall
    - $\star$  maximal coverage ratio
    - \* maximal f-score

Optimal GPR causes (recall, coverage ratio and f-score):

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 $\star$  in polynomial space

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- recall-optimal: obvious as any SPR is a subset of  ${\boldsymbol{\mathcal{C}}}$
- covratio-opt = recall-opt:  $\frac{TP}{FN} < \frac{TP'}{FN'}$  iff  $\frac{TP}{FN+TP} < \frac{TP'}{FN'+TP'}$

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#### Optimal SPR causes:

- $\star$  recall-optimal = covratio-optimal: computable in poly-time
- \* f-score optimal causes:

MC: in poly-time via reduction to SSPP in MDPs MDP: in exp-time via reduction to SSP-games





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$$\max_{C} fscore(C) = \frac{2}{X+2} \text{ where } X = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{N}}^{\min}(\text{weight})$$

#### Summary: algorithmic problems for PR causes

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Results on strict and global probability-raising causality in Markov chains and MDPs (with fixed effect set E):

For fixed set **C**:

	checking PR condition	computing quality measures (recall, coverage ratio, f-score)
SPR	∈P	poly-time
GPR	$\begin{array}{ll} MDP: \in PSPACE \\ MC: & \in P \end{array}$	poly-time

# Summary: algorithmic problems for PR causes

Results on strict and global probability-raising causality in Markov chains and MDPs (with fixed effect set E):

Finding optimal causes and related threshold problems:

	covratio-optimal = recall-optimal	f-score-optimal	threshold problem
SPR	poly-time	MDP: poly-space MC: poly-time	f-score threshold problem $\begin{array}{l} MDP:\ \in NP\capcoNP\\ MC:\ \ \in P \end{array}$
GPR	poly-space		$\begin{array}{ll} MDP: \in PSPACE \\ MC: & NP-complete \end{array}$

part 1: notions of causality and responsibility in TS

- forward causality
  - $\star\,$  necessary and sufficient causes (formalization in CTL\*)
  - counterfactual: mutation- or game-based definition open: is there a logical characterization? (using some hyperlogic?)
- backward causality
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- measures for the importance of states on temporal properties
  - degree of responsibility for the satisfaction of properties: mutation- or game-based definition via size of smallest switching pairs
  - $\star\,$  Shapley values to measure the importance of states on the truth of path formulas
    - quantitative version of forward responsibility
    - analogous for strategic backward responsibility, but unclear for causal backward resp.
    - more difficult for branching-time logics [Mascle et al, LICS'21]

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  - $\star\,$  Shapley values to measure the importance of states on the truth of path formulas
- Aumann-Shapley values for models with continuous parameters

e.g., to measure the impact of probability parameters in parametric Markov chains on reachability probabilities or expected costs [B., Funke, Majumdar, AAAI'21]

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- measures for the importance of states on temporal properties
- part 2: probabilistic causality in Markovian models
  - MDP-formalization of the PR condition Pr(effect|cause) > Pr(effect|-cause)
  - many open questions: path events for causes and effects, other quality measures, backward causality, actionability, ...

# THANK YOU